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Transgenic animals play a large role in several critical industries:
the pharmaceutical industry, the agricultural industry, farming, and
medical research. As these biotechnology-oriented industries have
grown, the United States and other industrialized nations have real-
ized the importance of patent protection for genetically-engineered
animals. Unfortunately, lesser-developed countries (LDCs), which
can benefit the most from such industries, do not provide adequate
patent protection for transgenic animals, even though patent protec-
tion for transgenic animals could ultimately lead to reduction in star-
vation and disease, two of the biggest problems facing many LDCs.
The United States should pursue bilateral negotiations with develop-
ing countries in the area of animal patents to secure patent protection
for transgenic animals. Because of their flexibility, bilateral agree-
ments offer a better short-term solution than multilateral agreements.
This comment first describes the methods for creating transgenic
animals and the importance of these animals. Second, this article out-
lines the current state of animal patents in industrialized countries and
the various controversies those countries have faced during the devel-
opment of their current policies. Third, this article explains and re-
futes the arguments advanced by developing countries to support their
lack of adequate patent protection for transgenic animals. Finally, this
article shows that the best short-term solution to align the views of the
industrialized countries with those of the various developing countries
are bilateral agreements rather than multilateral agreements.
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II. BIOTECHNOLOGY RELATING TO ANimAIs
A. What are Patentable Animals?
Patentable animals are the result of recombinant DNA technol-
ogy, commonly known as genetic engineering. DNA (deox-
yribonucleic acid) is the essential molecule in living creatures,
containing the information required to make cells grow into living
creatures in the necessary manner.' DNA is made up of smaller units
known as genes. Genes are the building blocks which contain certain
characteristics an organism will have. Genes may be spliced and com-
bined in different ways. Recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology in-
volves this splicing and manipulation of genes.2
In addition to rDNA techniques, the slow and unpredictable
traditional breeding technique is sometimes used to create animals
with certain specified traits. In that traditional process, the breeder
selects the animals to mate based on the specific physical traits that
the breeder wishes the offspring to acquire, such as a certain color or
weight? The breeder chooses the animals to be bred based on mani-
fest physical traits, rather than on particular genetic characteristics.4
Therefore, the results are unpredictable, because one responsible gene
is not identified and transferred by itself. Rather, a characteristic trait
of an animal is chosen, and while the parent has the correct gene, the
egg or sperm might not contain that gene, because the desired gene
has not been isolated from other genetic material that might be se-
lected instead.' The traditional methods also require that the breed-
ing material be that of a closely related species, or different strains
within a species, rather than two very different species.' Absent this
factor, the animals could not breed successfully.
In contrast with classical breeding techniques, genetic engineer-
ing involves the alteration of animals through the addition of DNA
from another species of animal or from a human.7 The most common
procedure is called microinjection, which involves several steps.8
1 Elizabeth Joy Hecht, Beyond Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: The Controversy
Over Transgenic Animal Patents Continues, 41 Am. U. L. RPv. 1023, 1026 (1992).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1027.
5 Id. at 1028 n. 21. The term 'selected' here means the random sampling that occurs when
one item is chosen out of many.
6 Id. at 1028 n. 22.
7 Id. at 1027.
8 Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life, 28 JUiME-mcs
J. 399, 405 (1988).
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First, a desired gene is isolated from the original species. Then the
gene is microinjected through a glass tube into a fertilized embryo of
the donee species while it is still at the single-cell stage.9 The egg is
then implanted into the female of the donee species, where the egg
gestates until the resultant transgenic animal is born.10 The embryo is
injected at the single-cell stage, so as that single cell divides and multi-
plies, all cells in the resulting animal will contain the foreign gene.
Therefore, the alien gene may be passed on to offspring, because the
foreign gene will be part of the sperm or egg cells also."
As a result of genetic engineering, breeders and scientists can
more easily produce transgenic animals with specific desirable quali-
ties. Examples of genetically engineered animals include: chickens
immune to certain diseases, cows that provide more milk, pigs that
produce low cholesterol meat, and mice or cows that produce medici-
nally-useful chemicals. 2
B. What are the Benefits of Transgenic Animals?
Genetically-engineered animals are used in the agricultural
pharmaceuticals, and biomedical research industries. These industries
all incur high research and development costs, because large invest-
ments of time and money are required before a product is fully devel-
oped.' 3 The only practical way to recoup investment is through patent
protection.' 4 Patent protection grants a monopoly to the original in-
ventor for seventeen years, during which time nobody else may make,
use or sell the patented invention.' 5 During that time, the inventors
may recoup their investment through royalties. While other forms of
protection are available, they are not as reliable. For example, trade
secret protection only protects an invention that has not become pub-
licly known and does not prevent others from creating the same inven-
tion.' 6 Thus, an inventor who relies on trade secrets risks the chance
that somebody else will create a similar invention and be able to take




12 Dorothy Nelkin, Living Inventions: Animal Patenting in the United States and Europe, 4
STAN. L & PoL'Y REv. 203, 203-04 (1993).
13 Louis A. Schapiro, The Role of Intellectual Property Protection and International Competi-
tiveness, 58 ArrrrrRusT 569, 572 (1989).
14 Id.
15 Dresser, supra note 8, at 402.
16 Hecht, supra note 1, at 1065 n. 251.
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In the agricultural area, genetic engineers can create healthier
livestock animals which produce greater quantities of food, since cer-
tain transgenic animals can grow faster with lower nutritional needs.'7
As the expected demand for worldwide food production increases, es-
pecially in developing countries, the need for such highly productive
animals becomes compelling. 18 Critics complain that some of these
animals have health problems. For example, some cows that are in-
jected with a genetically-engineered hormone to produce larger
amounts of milk suffer from inflamed udders, decreased immune func-
tion and reduced reproductive capacity. 19 However, according to
scientists, these problems occur only at very high dose levels, and will
not occur at the normal lower dose levels.20
In the pharmaceuticals industry, genetically-engineered animals
serve several purposes. First, many animal proteins are used as vac-
cines to treat illnesses. These proteins may be more easily available
through transgenic animals. Genes containing the protein may be in-
serted into the fertilized egg of a host species.2 ' As a result, the milk
from the transgenic animal will contain that protein, which may then
be extracted from the milk and used as a pharmaceutical. For in-
stance, in Japan, silkworms produce a vaccine for hepatitis.22 LDCs
could benefit greatly from improved pharmaceutical production capa-
bility. Second, pharmaceuticals companies use transgenic animals that
are prone to certain diseases to test various drugs in order to deter-
mine their effectiveness.
Transgenic animals are also used for biomedical research. Using
transgenic animals, scientists are studying how cells operate. Also,
scientists are learning about human diseases, and treatments for ill-
nesses such as Alzheimer's disease, cancer and AIDS.23 For instance,
the Harvard Mouse, patented in the United States, is designed to be
more prone to cancer, allowing scientists to study cancer and possible
methods of treatment.2 4
17 Dresser, supra note 8, at 407.
18 Dresser, supra note 8, at 407.
19 John Beiswenger, Note, Moving Beyond Risk In Assessing Technological Artifacts: The
Case of Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 16 VT. L. REv. 667, 682-83 (1992).
20 aIL at 684.
21 See Nelkin, supra note 12, at 194.
22 See Nelkin, supra note 12, at 194.
23 See Hecht, supra note 1, at 1038.
24 See Hecht, supra note 1, at 1035 n. 81. U.S. Patent Number 4,736,866. Researchers from
Harvard isolated the gene that causes cancer in humans. Once isolated, the researchers injected
that gene into a fertilized mouse egg that developed into the Harvard mouse. This resulted in
more efficient laboratory testing of suspected carcinogens than was previously possible with or-
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III. PATENTING OF TRANSGENIC ANIMALS IN DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
A. The Current State of Animal Patents
In developed countries, the primary purposes behind patent laws
are to encourage investment in research and development, and to pro-
mote scientific innovation.' Incentives include monopoly power and
royalties. 26 For animal patents in particular, an additional goal is to
promote research and development in understanding and combating
disease.27 Also, issuance of animal patents will promote industry-wide
disclosure of important biotechnology research developments.28 The
developed countries that allow animal patents include the United
States, the nations of the European Community, Australia and Japan.
In the United States, patents are granted for inventions that are
useful,29 novel" and non-obvious.3 ' Additionally, a patent applica-
tion must be written such that it will enable a person skilled in the
relevant field to make and use the invention.3 2 However, it was a long
time before living organisms were patented. The patent statute was
not construed to allow protection for living organisms until fairly re-
cently. Although the United States now readily grants animal patents
that meet the criteria of the patent statute, the first animal patents
faced much skepticism from the American public and the Patent &
Trademark Office (PTO). The first United States patent granted for a
living organism was for a type of bacteria that breaks down compo-
nents in crude oil.33 After the PTO denied the patent, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. In Chakrabarty, the
Supreme Court held that genetically engineered microorganisms were
dinary mice. Harvard mice are useful because modified genes make them susceptible to carcino-
gens at levels comparable to those which might cause cancer in humans, thereby eliminating the
need for extreme overdoses required to cause comparable results in unmodified animals.
25 David Manspeizer, Comment, The Cheshire Cat the March Hare, and the Harvard Mouse:
Animal Patents Open Up a Whole New Wonderland, 43 RuTGERS L. REv. 417, 422 (1991).
26 A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality
or Myth?, 1987 DUKE LJ. 831, 834 (1987).
27 JUDITH CURRY, THE PATENTABILITY OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS AND ANI-
MALS IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1987); Michael B. Landau, Multicel-
lular Vertebrate Mammals as Patentable Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: Promotion of
Science or and Open Invitation for Abuse?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 203, 216-17 (1993).
28 Hecht, supra note 1, at 1039.
29 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
30 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
31 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
32 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).




patentable subject matter within the meaning of § 101. 31 The Court
relied on evidence that Congress intended the patent statute to be
construed broadly, including "anything under the sun that is made by
man."3- Later, adhering to the Chakrabarty decision, the PTO de-
cided that the patent statute would be extended to multicellular orga-
nisms. 6 A patent was issued for sterile oysters which were edible
throughout the entire year.37 Finally, the first animal patent was
granted in the United States in 1988 for a mouse developed by several
researchers from Harvard.38 The "Harvard Mouse" was an animal
designed to be prone to cancer by microinjection of cancer genes into
the embryos of mice.39 Since the "Harvard Mouse," other strains of
transgenic mice have been patented in the United States. For exam-
ple, Ohio University patented a virus-resistant mouse that produces
interferon, a useful treatment for disease.4" GenPharm, a pharmaceu-
tical company, has patented a strain of mice that does not have a fully-
operating immune system.41 Harvard has received another patent for
a type of mouse whose males develop an enlarged prostrate gland,
enabling scientists to study the same common problem among human
males.42
Europe has also granted patents for transgenic animals. Article
52(1) of the European Patent Convention (EPC) defines patentable
subject matter as "inventions which are susceptible of industrial appli-
cation, which are new, and which involve an inventive step."43 This
definition is limited by Article 53(a) which contains a provision deny-
ing patents on inventions that are offensive to public morality.44 Arti-
cle 53(b) also lists specific exclusions to patentable inventions,
including plant and animals varieties.45 Initially, the Examining Divi-
sion of the European Patent Office (EPO) interpreted these provi-
sions to exclude the Harvard Mouse patent.46 However, in 1991 the
34 Id
35 Id
36 Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987).
37 Id. at 1428.
38 Hecht, supra note 1, at 1035.
39 Hecht, supra note 1, at 1035.
40 Dawn Of Age Of'Designer' Lab Animals, Daily News Telegraph, Dec. 31, 1992, available
in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS-C Database.
41 Id.
42 Id
43 European Patent Convention, Article 52(1) (1980).
44 European Patent Convention, Article 53(a) (1980).
45 European Patent Convention, Article 53(b) (1980).
46 Cynthia M. Ho, Building A Better Mousetrap: Patenting Biotechnology in the European
Community, 3 DtuKE J. COMP. & INV'L L. 173, 178 (1992).
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Technical Board of Appeals of the European Patent Office reversed
that decision, stating that Article 53(b) does not exclude animal pat-
ents per se.47 Furthermore, the Board stated that for this particular
patent, the contributions to human benefit outweighed any potential
drawbacks. 8 Thus, the patent did not violate the ethical concerns of
Article 53(a).49 The Board also determined that animal patents in the
European Community will be examined on a case by case basis, mean-
ing that future patents for transgenic animal may or may not be
granted in Europe.50 This shows that Europe is still skeptical about
granting patents for transgenic animals.
The Commission of the European Community has generally sup-
ported animal patents.5 In fact, the European Community 1988
Council Directive states that all products of biotechnology, including
genetically engineered animals and plants, are the result of microbio-
logical processes and are patentable.52 Yet, there have been proposals
to amend this Directive. The proposals include a definition of biologi-
cal material, and a provision denying patent protection to any trans-
genic animals which are likely to inflict suffering upon animals without
any benefit to humans or animals.53 Nevertheless, even if the EPO5"
grants a patent, certain legislation within individual member nations
may restrict the use of the patent through regulation. For example,
Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom have legislation for bio-
technology regulation.55 In April, 1991, the Economic Community
published a policy paper aimed at preventing such legislation because
it prevents the "free flow" of biotechnological inventions, 56 But the
response to the paper has been inconsistent throughout the European
Community, and no developments are likely in the near future.57
47 Margaret J. Lane, Patenting Life: Responses of Patent Offices in the U.S. and Abroad, 32
JURIMETRICS J. 89, 99 (1991).
48 Id. at 99-100.
49 Ho, supra note 46, at 178.
50 Lane, supra note 47, at 100.
51 The member states include Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
52 Lane, supra note 47, at 98.
53 EC Amends Biotech Directive, 5 No. 4 J. PROPRIErARY RTs. 36 (1993).
54 The EPO is the European counterpart to the PTO in the United States. The EPO is the
office that examines patent applications and determines whether or not to grant a patent for a
particular invention. The patent is then granted for all member states of the European Commu-
nity, subject to regulation by the individual member states.
55 Ho, supra note 46, at 179 n.38.
56 Alan S. Gutterman, International Intellectual Property: A Summary of Recent Develop-
ments and Issues for the Coming Decade, 8 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH Li. 335,356-57
(1992) [hereinafter Gutterman].




Australia also grants patent protection for transgenic animals.
The Patents Act of 1990 defines patentable inventions as those that
are useful, novel, and inventive, but the statute explicitly exempts
human beings from patentability.5" One example of patent protection
for a transgenic animal is a patent for a genetically-engineered pig.
That pig was injected with pig growth hormone, resulting in faster
growth and leaner meat than normal pigs. Such an animal could be
brought into the market faster with less food required per unit weight
of the pig.59
Under the Japanese Patent Law, patents are granted to the first
person to file for a patent, as long as the invention is novel, "industri-
ally useful," inventive and properly disclosed.60 Like Europe, Japan
regards anything contrary to public morality as unpatentable. 6' Yet,
Japan allows animals to be patented, and historically, the Japanese
people have been very receptive to the extensive application of bio-
technology to life.62 This greater acceptance of biotechnology is quite
different than the skepticism encountered in the United States and
Europe.6" Accordingly, Article 2 of the Japanese Patent Law, which
defines an invention, includes microorganisms and "novel and distinct
plant and animal varieties and species."64 The first animal patent was
filed in 1977 by the inventor of a rat designed to be born with heredi-
tary cataracts.65
B. Opposition to Animal Patenting
Most of the developed countries initially hesitated to grant patent
protection for transgenic animals. Those countries encountered pro-
tests from animal rights activists, farmers, religious groups and
environmentalists.
Animal rights activists argue that animal patents cause animals
unnecessary suffering. They claim that inventors purposely cause ani-
58 Patents Act 1990, ch. 2, sec. 18 (Australia).
59 Australia Patent For Genetically Engineered Pig, Australia and New Zealand Reuters Eco-
nomic News, Apr. 1, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS-C Database.
60 Takashi Ishida, Helpful Hints to Effective Japanese Patent Protection, in GLOBAL INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY SERIES: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES-PATENT, at 93, 95 (PLI Patents, Copy-
rights, Trademarks and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 319, 1991).
61 Patent Law, ch. 3, art. 32 (Japan).
62 Brian C. Cunningham & Joyce C. Chow, The Biotechnology Industry in Japan: A Frame-
work for Entry, 4 No. 7 J. PROPRIETARY Rrs. 13 (1992).
63 Id.
64 Ishida, supra note 60, at 97.
65 Ishida, supra note 60, at 110 App. 3.
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mals to be susceptible to diseases. 66  However, since the resulting
animals are more responsive to experimental treatments, fewer ani-
mals are necessary for testing. Thus, the number of animals that suffer
is actually reduced.' Moreover, it is at least arguable that the use of
animals for testing purposes is justified, because our society deter-
mined long ago that it is acceptable to sacrifice the welfare of animals
in order to obtain benefits for human beings.68
Smaller scale farmers fear that the use of transgenic animals will
result in their being "squeezed" out of business.69 They feel that they
will be forced to pay more for patented livestock because of royalty
and license fees paid to biotechnology companies.70 Smaller scale
farmers worry that these higher costs, plus the increased productivity
per animal, will force them out of business. Moreover, farmers fear
that biotechnology companies will control the market, and the farmers
will become dependent on these companies.7' Nevertheless, most of
the livestock resulting from genetic engineering will actually help
farmers. Diseases in farm animals cause many animals to die prema-
turely or produce infected meat. As a result, farm yields only reach
sixty-five to seventy percent of their potential.72 Since many trans-
genic animals are designed to be resistant to disease, these animals
will help reduce the disease problem and increase farm productivity.73
For example, a type of transgenic chicken has been injected with
genes to protect the chickens against a common disease, avian leuko-
sis. 7 4 This illness costs the poultry industry up to one hundred million
dollars a year.75 These costs will be greatly reduced as a result of this
transgenic chicken. Congress has responded to the farmers' argu-
ments by proposing a farmers' exemption.76 Under such an exemp-
tion, it is not an act of infringement for a farmer to reproduce a
patented transgenic animal through normal breeding, to use such an
animal in farming operations, or to sell such an animal or its off-
66 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 442.
67 Lane, supra note 47, at 95.
68 Hecht, supra note 1, at 1056.
69 Hecht, supra note 1, at 1042.
70 Hecht, supra note 1, at 1042.
71 Presumably, this is a bigger concern for smaller scale farmers. Large farmers have a larger
financial base, so that the payment of royalties will not have such a detrimental impact.
72 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 430.
73 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 430.
74 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 430.
75 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 430.
76 Hecht, supra note 1, at 1066.
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spring.77 This exemption represents a reasonable compromise be-
tween the interests of the smaller scale farmers and the interests of the
transgenic animal inventors.
Religious groups feel that transgenic animals are a means of
"playing God".78 These groups feel that respect for God is
threatened, the value of human life is reduced, and the desire for prof-
its has taken over more traditional values. They believe humans will
essentially become commodities. 79 Nevertheless, these groups over-
look the fact that humans are not patentable subject matter in any
country, and scientists are unable to produce creatures with large por-
tions of human cells. Furthermore, these concerns do not relate to the
patent law. These arguments are against the existence of research it-
self.80 Moreover, these groups ignore the fact that many of the ani-
mals used in research have been used and owned by humans for
centuries.8 Animal patent protection will not change this practice.
Finally, on the other side of the argument, many religious and ethical
scholars believe that humans have a moral obligation tor pursue activi-
ties that can relieve or avoid undue suffering.82 Gene manipulation is
an activity that can ease human suffering tremendously, by allowing
scientists to learn about disease and the mechanisms for treating dis-
ease, and by allowing enhanced food production to relieve starvation.
The benefits of patents, particularly on transgenic animals, are in the'
areas which can greatly benefit humankind, including health care and
farming.83
Finally, environmentalists are concerned that biodiversity will be
disrupted by the mutations created by genetic engineering, and even-
tually, native species will be driven to extinction! 4 This argument has
no basis. Species do not exist in nature as discrete creatures but as
"reproductive communities".8 " Thus, there is no true biodiversity to
be disrupted. Moreover, the animals in question are made up of
thousands of genes; therefore, manipulating an insignificant number
of genes will not destroy anything essential to the identity of a spe-
77 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 450. However, the germ cells, sperm or embryo of the pat-
ented transgenic animal, may not be sold without permission from the patent owner.
78 Dresser, supra note 8, at 411.
79 Dresser, supra note 8, at 416.
80 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 436-37.
81 Dresser, supra note 8, at 413.
82 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 438-39.
83 Lane, supra note 47, at 96.
84 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 436-37.
85 Kevin W. O'Connor, Patenting Animals And Other Living Things, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 597,
610 (1991).
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cies.8 6 Also, environmentalists fear the potential harmful effects of
widespread pollution and disease if genetically engineered creatures
are released into the environmentY. Yet, engineered animals are not
released into nature so there will be little, if any, introduction of the
altered genes into the natural gene pool. The likelihood that genetic
material would be transferred between a transgenic animal and a nor-
mal animal is extremely slight."8 Besides, even if the animals are re-
leased, they would not be likely to survive in the wild, since the
transgenic animals that are produced in the laboratory are acclimated
to the sterile laboratory environment.8 9
The majority of developed countries have come to realize that
these arguments are not strong enough to overcome the benefits of
animal patents. Nevertheless, many of these developed countries
have taken the arguments into account by enacting morality clauses.
IV. PATENTING TRANSGENIC ANIMALS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Unfortunately, the LDCs do not grant adequate patent protec-
tion for transgenic animals. Historically, the scenario in lesser-devel-
oped countries with goods patented elsewhere has been as follows. A
local entity pirates an invention developed in an industrialized coun-
try. "Copycats" can be sold at lower prices, since the pirates incur no
research and development costs.90 These pirates steal the profits from
the developed country that originally created the product. At a first
glance, the fact that the LDCs obtain the technology at a low cost
might seem good. However, as described below, piracy can actually
have detrimental effects on the LDCs, and can operate against the
best interests of the LDCs.
A. Reasons for Denial of Patents
Developing countries are reluctant to enforce patent protection
in general. Yet, even in countries where progress has been made to
expand patent protection, patents may still be denied for animals.
Generally, developing countries have denied patents for several
reasons. First, LDCs feel that their own domestic industries will be
86 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 437.
87 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 432.
88 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 432.
89 Manspeizer, supra note 25, at 424.




promoted by restricting patents.91 Since granting a patent is like
granting a monopoly, LDCs feel that their local businesses would not
be able to compete. Second, LDCs want to guarantee low costs and
availability of patented products to their citizens.' In granting the
patent monopoly, the LDCs fear that the resulting price of patented
technology would be artificially high. Third, LDCs want to allow do-
mestic industries greater access to foreign technology.9 3 They think
this goal can be achieved only if domestic producers do not have to
pay high royalties for the technology. Finally, there are basic cultural
attitudes behind denial of intellectual property rights.94 LDCs feel
that knowledge is something to be used for public benefit. This goes
against the view of industrialized nations that knowledge is a private
capital good.95
Developing countries generally use several methods to restrict
patent protection. First, LDCs restrict the subject matter of patenta-
ble inventions.96 For instance, India and Argentina do not allow phar-
maceutical products to be patented.97 Second, LDCs have short
patent terms. 8 Often, by the time an inventor from a developed
country has received patent protection, the term is nearly expired.
Third, LDCs have early lapse requirements.9 9 That is, if a patented
invention is not used in that country within a specified time period,
the patent is automatically terminated, even though the patent term
has not yet expired. Finally, LDCs often require compulsory licens-
ing."° This restriction allows third parties to obtain licenses to use or
sell a patented invention at very low royalty rates without the consent
of the patent holder.
91 Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, 28 WAKE Fo s'r L. REv. 89, 122 n.224 (1993).
92 Id. at 123. For example, LDCs view certain products such as pharmaceuticals to be essen-
tial to mankind, and such products should be available to their citizens at a lower cost. The
monopoly rights of patent protection would only serve to increase the costs of those products.
93 Adam L. Streltzer, U.S. Biotechnology Intellectual Property Rights as an Obstacle To The
UNCED Convention On Biological Diversity: It Just Doesn't Matter, 6 TRANSNA''L 271, 282
(1993).
94 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 122.
95 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 122.
96 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 114.
97 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 122.
98 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 93.
99 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 114.
100 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 94.
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B. Benefits to Developing Countries of Patent Protection in
General
Developing countries can benefit from strong patent protection.
In fact, denial of patent protection actually leads to the detrimental
results which the LDCs fear.
First, patent protection promotes the availability of an invention
in that country.101 Inventors from developed countries will not be
afraid of piracy, and therefore will be more willing to make their in-
vention available in the developing country. If a developing country
denies patent protection for a certain invention created in an industri-
alized nation, the inventor will be reluctant to market the product in
the developing country for fear of losing profits to pirates. As a result,
without patent protection, the availability of the product is reduced.'0
Developing countries might still get things through the black market
or counterfeiters, but this avenue is much more difficult than simply
procuring license agreements or paying royalties.
Second, patents may promote the amount of foreign investment
in an LDC, which would lead to increased development. 10 3 As the
biotechnology industry is highly speculative and involves enormous
research costs, substantial expectations of profits are necessary to con-
vince investors to put their money at risk in a biotechnology entity.
Without large returns, most investors will not have the incentive to
become involved.104 Such profit-earning capacity cannot exist in an
environment that fosters piracy and counterfeiting, because pirates
and counterfeiters steal profits from potential investors. 05 "Top-of-
the-line" technology will not be brought into an LDC by other coun-
tries if it is not going to receive protection.06
Third, patents may promote the local knowledge base, leading to
a better foundation for growth of domestic industries.0 7 For instance,
with animal patents, if the animals are made available to developing
countries, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies could grow
by licensing and using these inventions to conduct their research.
However, these products will not be made available if it is likely that
these products will be copied and profits will be stolen from the com-
101 I.L. "Pep" Fuller, Intellectual Property Rights Associated With Biotechnology - An Interna-
tional Trade Perspective, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N. 529, 537 (1989).
102 Id.
103 Streltzer, supra note 93, at 283.
104 Streltzer, supra note 93, at 283.
105 Fuller, supra note 101, at 537.
106 Schapiro, supra note 13, at 578.
107 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 120.
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pany making those products. Most importantly, however, the en-
abling provision of patent laws require full disclosure of an
invention.10 8 Thus, by granting patent protection for an invention, de-
veloping countries would have access to technological information.
This information can help developing countries learn about various
technologies, promoting their own development and growth. An al-
ternative to patent law is trade secret law, which affords protection
forever, as long as the owner takes certain measures to ensure the
secret is kept.109 Trade secret law prevents disclosure, does not pro-
mote information sharing and may limit availability of inventions out
of fear of losing the secret. 110 If developing countries want access to
technology, patent law provides this access, but trade secret law does
not.
Finally, by granting patent protection, a developing country can
minimize enforcement and transactions costs.'' That is, if LDCs do
not grant adequate patent protection, the United States or other coun-
tries might resort to unilateral actions, including sanctions. For the
United States, Section 301 sanctions are one such device." 2 Under
the Special 301 provision, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) identifies "priority countries" that do not provide adequate
intellectual property protection to the United States.1 3 The USTR
then initiates unfair trade practice investigations." 4 If an agreement
is not reached between the two countries within six months, the Presi-
dent may take retaliatory measures against the pirating country ac-
cording to Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988.115 For instance, sanctions may be imposed, resulting in
greater costs to the LDC than the initial patent protection. This type
of unilateral action might be a good deterrent to pirating efforts; how-
ever, several countries have been critical of Section 301 procedures,
including some trading partners of the United States." 6 Therefore,
the United States must be careful not to overuse these procedures,
which could potentially result in strained relationships.
108 Lane, supra note 47, at 91.
109 Hecht, supra note 1, at 1065 n.251.
110 Lane, supra note 47, at 96.
1I Gutternan, supra note 91, at 120.
112 19 U.S.C § 2411 (1988).
113 Schapiro, supra note 13, at 581.
114 Schapiro, supra note 13, at 581.
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C. Animal Patents and Their Importance for Developing
Countries
The primary applications for transgenic animals are in the phar-
maceutical, agricultural, and medical research industries. These indus-
tries are critical to the development of LDCs, because two of the
largest problems faced by developing countries are starvation and
disease.
Protecting animal patents for the promotion of the pharmaceuti-
cal industry can promote the availability of medicines, because many
pharmaceutical products are produced by transgenic animals. Pro-
moting the availability of these animals will lead to increased availa-
bility of pharmaceuticals. Developed countries with a wealth of
resources in pharmaceutical manufacturing will be more willing to in-
vest in the pharmaceutical industry of developing nations if they are
likely to earn profits. This investment will enhance the growth and
efficiency of the pharmaceutical industry, thereby enlarging the avail-
ability of pharmaceuticals in LDCs.
Protecting animal patents for the promotion of the agricultural
industry will promote food supplies, reducing starvation in the LDCs.
Some transgenic animals are able to produce healthier food in greater
quantities than normal animals, with reduced nutritional require-
ments. Therefore, increased food production results, since it costs less
to produce more food from these animals. This increased productivity
could have great benefits for starvation in LDCs. However, industri-
alized countries that presently have the ability to create these animals
are only likely to make the animals available to LDCs if they will re-
ceive profits in return.
Protecting animal patents for medical research will promote the
health of citizens through an understanding of disease and the means
for treating disease. Scientists within a developing country might be
able to use transgenic animals to gain an understanding of illnesses
specific to that country. Yet, the industrialized nations are only likely
to let the LDCs use their inventions to gain such an understanding if
the invention receives patent protection. Furthermore, the local
knowledge base of scientists in an LDC can increase if they are able to
observe and learn about such inventions. However, since patent laws
are the only laws which favor full disclosure of an invention, the LDC
will never gain the knowledge necessary to create transgenic animals
unless patent laws are enacted, because the industrialized nations will
have greater incentives to keep their inventions secret rather than risk
stolen profits. Therefore, not only can the patent laws allow scientists
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in an LDC to target their research to diseases specific to that country,
but patent laws can also promote the flow of information to an LDC.
D. Individual Variations in Patent Protection Among Various
LDCs
As developed countries try to improve worldwide patent protec-
tion, the biggest problem they face is that developing countries do not
understand the importance of patent protection. One way to convince
the LDCs to embrace patent protection may be to stress that patent
protection will induce foreign investment and allow access to new
technology.117 Since different countries have varying levels of under-
standing of the importance of patent protection in general, bilateral
agreements are necessary to make those individual countries appreci-
ate the benefits of animal patent protection. Bilateral agreements in-
volve negotiations between the United States and a single trading
partner, and allow for a tailored agreement. 1 8
A brief look at Mexico's, India's, and Brazil's approaches to pat-
ent law will point out the need for bilateral agreements. Mexico has
appeared willing to grant patent protection on its own, while Brazil
has needed threats before it has revised its patent laws. India still
seems unwilling to change its patent laws.
Mexico initially adopted a utilitarian view toward patent protec-
tion. That is, Mexico viewed intellectual property rights as the com-
mon heritage of all citizens. 119 Intellectual property was to benefit
national, not personal, developments. 20 This view conflicts with the
view held by industrialized nations that intellectual property is private
property.12' Recently, Mexico has shifted its view of intellectual prop-
erty, because of the realization that patent protection is essential to
foreign investment and access to technology. 2 2 Mexico adopted a
new "Industrial Property Law" in 1991, which provides for some pro-
gress. 23 Today, Mexico gives patent protection for some types of bio-
technology: plant varieties and microorganisms. 24 Animal species
117 Fuller, supra note 101, at 537.
118 Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New
Muhdilateralism, 76 IowA L. REv. 273, 295 (1991).
119 Gretchen A. Pemberton & Mariano Soni, Mexico's 1991 Industrial Property Law, 25 CoR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 103, 106 (1992).
120 Id. at 106 n.17.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 116.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 117.
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are not yet patentable subject matter. However, the new law indicates
that Mexico wants to encourage foreign investment, and recognizes
the importance of patent protection. Therefore, if the Mexican gov-
ernment were made aware of the problems presented by patent re-
strictions on animals, further reforms might result.125
Brazil has historically been staunchly opposed to patent protec-
tion, fearing that patent laws will prevent it from receiving the tech-
nology necessary for growth. Brazil has many restrictions on
patentable subject matter.126 In the area of computer software specifi-
cally, Brazil was forced to undertake bilateral negotiations as a result
of threatened Section 301 sanctions. 127 During the negotiations, Bra-
zil suggested a new software protection law. Although foreign invest-
ment in Brazil has not grown appreciably so far, Section 301 has been,
thus far, a useful tool in improving protection for intellectual property
rights in software. 28 In 1993, the USTR again threatened section 301
sanctions.' 29 These actions, together with Brazil's recognition of the
need for foreign investment, have induced Brazil to revise its intellec-
tual property laws. The propsed laws will address deficiencies identi-
fied by the United States, including inadequate protection for plant
and animal varieties and species. 30
India is another staunch opponent of patent protection in gen-
eral. Like Brazil, India fears patent laws will stop growth. Indian pat-
ent law restricts the subject matter for which patent protection is
available and provides for short patent terms.' 3' This inadequate pro-
tection stems from India's belief that developing countries should be
given concessions in certain areas, and that, due to economic differ-
ences, India can not be expected to provide the same patent protec-
tion as industrialized countries.' 32 Rather, all countries should design
their patent laws to their own needs. 33 Furthermore, India sees patent
laws as suppressing domestic research and development. 34
As seen by these examples, each of these lesser-developed coun-
tries is at a different level of understanding of the importance of intel-
lectual property protection. Mexico has seemed to promote patent
125 Id. at 130.
126 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 129.
-127 Schapiro, supra note 13, at 580.
128 Schapiro, supra note 13, at 580.
129 Market Reports, September 15, 1993, available in Lexis, ASIAPC library, ALLASI file.
130 Id.
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132 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 132.
133 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 132.
134 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 132.
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protection on its own, Brazil has changed its laws only after threats,
and India still refuses to grant patent protection. Since each country's
views are unique, bilateral negotiations are the best approach for se-
curing patent protection for transgenic animals.
V. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ARE THE PROPER STARTING PLACE
The different mechanisms traditionally used by the United States
to reach agreements with its trading partners have been unilateral ac-
tions, bilateral agreements, or multilateral agreements. Bilateral
agreements are the best short-term action for ensuring patent protec-
tion for transgenic animals. In the long run, the bilateral agreements
may then be worked into multilateral agreements.
A. Types of International Agreements
1. Bilateral Agreements.
Bilateral agreements consist of direct negotiations with a given
country to reach a desired goal. Such negotiations should be backed
up by economic sanctions, if necessary. 35 In exchange for adequate
intellectual property protection, the country receives the right to ex-
port to the United States with most favored nation status.136 Ade-
quate protection facilitates export to the United States, and results in
direct investment from the United States. 37 If the bilateral negotia-
tions fail, the United States can threaten to impose sanctions, other-
wise known as unilateral action.' 38
The advantages of bilateral agreements are: 1) bilateral agree-
ments are more likely to be reached in the short term, because fewer
interests must be considered and negotiated, 139 2) bilateral agree-
ments offer flexibility in being able to address varying concerns of dif-
ferent nations,140 3) bilateral agreements can enable the United
States to reach a compromise with a particular trading partner that
might be undesirable with other partners,' 4' and 4) bilateral agree-
ments can be used to "break the ice" and convince skeptical nations
135 Leaffer, supra note 118, at 297.
136 Leaffer, supra note 118, at 297.
137 Leaffer, supra note 118, at 297.
138 Leaffer, supra note 118, at 297.
139 Senator Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral Agreements, 22 CoR-
NELL INr'L L.J. 1, 8 (1989).
140 Id.
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that agreements are good. Later, then, these nations might be more
willing to enter into multilateral agreements. 142
One argument against bilateral agreements is that they run
counter to long-term interests of international trade. Bilateral agree-
ments involve two nations, and thus result in a fragmented trading
system.' 43 This argument supports multilateral agreements, which in-
volve many countries. However, bilateral agreements are much easier
to reach in the short term, because the interests of only two countries
must be considered, rather than the interests of many. In addition,
during the course of bilateral negotiations, long term interests may be
considered, and such agreements may be worked into a longer term
multilateral agreement. The first step, however, must be the bilateral
meeting.
The United States has successfully negotiated several bilateral
agreements. For example, Taiwan has amended its copyright laws to
provide for more stringent penalties against pirates."4 Taiwan has
also enacted a new patent law. 45 In addition, Korea has made several
improvements in its intellectual property coverage. 46 Finally, Brazil
has expanded its protection of computer software. 47
2. Multilateral Agreements
An alternative to bilateral agreements are multilateral agree-
ments. Multilateral agreements involve the United States and many
trading partners.
Proponents of the multilateral approach espouse several reasons
for multilateral agreements being more advantageous. First of all,
proponents suggest that multilateral agreements involve many more
nations, not just one, and therefore these agreements are more effi-
cient.148 Second, proponents suggest that multilateral agreements cre-
ate far more uniformity, whereas bilateral agreements create a
"patchwork" of laws.' 49
On the other hand, multilateral agreements take many years to
finalize.'5 0 In negotiating a multilateral agreement, several countries
142 Baucus, supra note 139, at 7.
143 Leaffer, supra note 118, at 297.
14 Leaffer, supra note 118, at 297.
145 Leaffer, supra note 118, at 297.
146 Leaffer, supra note 118, at 297.
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might be unwilling to agree to particular provisions. Tailored bilateral
agreements with such countries might "break the ice" and introduce
them to the advantages of international agreements.15' Using bilat-
eral agreements as an intermediate step, these countries might be
more willing later to participate in multilateral talks. In fact, eventu-
ally, the bilateral agreements may be worked into multilateral ar-
rangements, and inconsistency would disappear. 152
Examples of problematic multilateral agreements are the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Biodiversity Treaty,
and the GAIT talks. WIPO is a United Nations body created to ad-
dress intellectual property issues, including an attempt at patent har-
monization. Developing countries are generally in favor of WIPO,
although some concern has been expressed over the broad range of
inventions given protection. 54 On the other hand, industrialized
countries remain opposed to WIPO, because the provisions would re-
quire the United States and other countries to stop patenting plant
and animal varieties, among other detrimental changes. 55 Arguments
also arose over the compulsory licensing provisions. 56 If the WIPO
proposals were enacted, the United States would be required to make
numerous changes to the existing patent system.'5 7 WIPO still re-
mains unfinished.
The Biodiversity Treaty is an international treaty directed at pro-
tecting animals and plants on the verge of extinction. The treaty was
open for signatures during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in
June, 1992, but the United States refused to sign the treaty. 58 The
refusal was due to concerns that the treaty would restrict biotechnol-
ogy development in the United States. Moreover, the treaty would
intrude on United States patent protection for the biotechnology in-
dustry, because the treaty did not give any concessions for patented
151 Schapiro, supra note 13, at 579.
152 Seung Wha Chang, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Other Pacific
Countries: Proposed Bilateral Agreements for Resolving International Conflicts Within the Pacific
Community, 16 HASTNGS INT'L AND COMP. L. REv. 295, 310 (1993).
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154 Gutterman, supra note 56, at 349.
155 Gutterman, supra note 91, at 105.
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inventions.159 This multilateral agreement also lacked consensus in
recognition of the importance of animal patents.
Perhaps the most promising multilateral agreement is GATT. In
the Uruguay Round of GATT talks, the developed nations were in
favor of the intellectual property proposals, while the LDCs were op-
posed to the proposals. 60 In particular, the industrialized nations fa-
vored the proposed dispute resolution mechanisms, which were unlike
provisions included in any other multilateral agreement. 161 Ulti-
mately, the talks have not been ratified, largely due to differences re-
lating to agricultural subsidies.' 62 Twenty or more issues remain
unadressed, such as the level and nature of intellectual property pro-
tection and phase-in procedures for LDCs. 163 Thus, the GATT agree-
ments also remain unfinished.
No consensus has been generated from any of these multilateral
agreements. Therefore, in the short term, the United States should
pursue bilateral agreements, especially in the area of animal
patenting.
B. Bilateral Agreements are the Best Short-term Mechanism for
Securing Patent Protection for Transgenic Animals
Bilateral, not multilateral agreements, are the proper starting
place for patent protection of transgenic animals. The United States
needs to prove to individual LDCs that animal patents can have signif-
icant benefits, without the concerns of other countries influencing the
negotiations. Animal patents could be especially beneficial to coun-
tries with pervasive starvation problems and disease.
In summary, patent protection for transgenic animals is impor-
tant, both for developed countries and developing countries. Trans-
genic animals provide benefits to the pharmaceutical, agricultural, and
medical research areas. These industries can directly help to solve
major problems facing third world countries.
Previous multilateral efforts to convince developing countries of
these benefits of patent protection for transgenic animals have failed.
Some developing countries have some understanding of the impor-
tance of patent protection to their development in general, while
other developing countries still deny patent protection, claiming pat-
159 Id.
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ent protection only undermines their economic growth. Bilateral
agreements will allow the United States to account for the baseline
understanding of the country in question in addressing patent protec-
tion for animals. The different viewpoints of the various countries can
be acknowledged more accurately through bilateral agreements, and a
better understanding can hopefully be reached. Bilateral agreements
will not only benefit developing nations and provide protection for
patentable transgenic animals, but may also be a first step towards
regional, hemispheric, and global harmonization of patent laws.
